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Introduction
The act of speech, standing alone, may border on the trivial.
Most speech becomes significant only when it is linked to a hearer;
generally, the more hearers, the greater the speech's potential signifi-
cance.' An intense symbiotic relationship exists, therefore, between
the act of speech and the various amplifying technologies that increase
its potential audience.2 Despite the close link between speech and
amplifying technology, the precise legal relationship between the two
remains one of our public policy enigmas.
At times, the Supreme Court has uncoupled technological ampli-
fication from speech, permitting regulation of the technology despite
its effect on a speaker's potential audience.' At times, the Court has
merged the act of speech into its amplifying technology, treating the
two as integral aspects of the act of communication.4 But the Court
has never attempted a comprehensive discussion of the issue. 5 In-
deed, the intellectual chaos that characterizes the legal rules gov-
erning regulation of broadcasting-both cable and over-the-air-is a
1. I do not mean to suggest that speech is important only because it has an impact on
the hearer. Thomas Emerson's powerful reminder of the self-affirming, dignitary nature of
speech demonstrates that speech may affect the speaker at least as intensely as it affects a
hearer. THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970). But the
self-affirming nature of speech is at least partially dependent on the speaker's belief that
someone will, or at least may, hear it. For current writing on the dignitary nature of
speech, see C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1989);
JURGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION: LIFEWORLD AND SYS-
TEM: A CRITIOUE OF FUNCTIONALIST REASON (1987).
2. Amplifying technologies include, at a minimum: the printing of posters, signs,
books, magazines, and newspapers; sound equipment; telephone, telegraph, tape record-
ings, phonograph records, and movies; radio and broadcast television; cable television; and
computer transmission. Other candidates include the postal service and highly visible street
rhetoric.
3. E.g., United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 113 S. Ct. 2696 (1993) (uncoupling
broadcast technology from speech); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989)
(uncoupling electronic amplification from speech); Los Angeles City Council v. Taxpayers
for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984) (uncoupling political posters from speech); Metromedia,
Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (uncoupling billboards from speech); Pitts-
burgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Rights, 413 U.S. 376 (1973) (uncoupling
print technology from speech); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949); Saia v. New York,
334 U.S. 558 (1948).
4. E.g., City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. 2038 (1994) (refusing to uncouple speech
from lawn sign); Lee v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 112 S. Ct. 2709
(1992) (refusing to uncouple leafletting from speech); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public
Utilities Comm'n of California, 475 U.S. 1 (1986) (refusing to uncouple speech from utility
billing envelopes); Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977)
(refusing to uncouple speech from lawn sign); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951);
Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
5. For a pioneering effort to think about speech and technology, see ITHIEL DE SOLA
POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM (1983).
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function of our failure to think more precisely about the relationship
between speech and amplifying technology.6
Until recently, the principal price paid for the lack of clarity in
thinking about the relationship between speech and amplifying tech-
nology was incoherent legal doctrine in the broadcast area.7 We are,
however, on the brink of an information era dominated by powerful
economic entities that both speak and exercise oligopolistic control
over the technology needed to amplify their speech.8 Where control
over amplifying technology carries with it not merely the ability to be
a powerful speaker, but also the power to prevent others from using
critical technology to reach a mass audience, free speech theory must
evolve more sophisticated ways to describe the intersection of speech,
law, and amplifying technology.
In order to confront the intersection of speech and amplifying
technology, we must answer at least six questions:
1. When, if ever, should we seek to separate the amplification pro-
cess from the idea of speech?
2. When, if ever, should we collapse the two concepts by treating
amplification as an integral part of the act of speaking?
3. When, if ever, should we encourage vertical integration of the
two concepts by allowing both functions to be performed by the
same economic unit?
.4. When, if ever, should we seek to separate speech from amplify-
ing technology by vesting control over each activity in a differ-
ent economic entity?
5. If we permit the same economic entity to function as both a
speaker and an amplifier, when, if ever, may the government
regulate either function?
6. See generally LUCAS A. POWE, JR., AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT (1987); Stanley Ingber, The First Amendment in Modern Garb: Returning
System Legitimacy, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 187 (1987).
In fairness, the Court's effort to draw lines between content-based regulations and
"time, place or manner" rules is one way of approaching the issue. See Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 789 (1989). Similarly, the use of the O'Brien test to measure
the constitutionality of regulations having an "incidental" effect on speech is an effort to
distinguish direct regulation of speech from other regulations. United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). Until Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445
(1994), vacating and remanding 819 F. Supp. 32 (D.D.C. 1993), reh'g denied, 115 S. Ct. 30
(1994), though, the Court did not use the "time, place or manner" doctrine or the O'Brien
test to explore the relationship between speech and amplifying technology, except perhaps
in a conclusory way. See infra text accompanying notes 68-109 for a discussion of Turner
Broadcasting.
7. See, e.g., Donald E. Lively, Modern Media and the First Amendment: Rediscover-
ing Freedom of the Press, 67 WASH. L. REV. 599 (1992).
8. For a helpful description of the modern information age, see Note, The Message in
the Medium: The First Amendment on the Information Superhighway, 107 HARV. L. REV.
1062 (1994).
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6. Finally, does the First Amendment inform, control, or inhibit
our answers to these questions?
I
An Overview of the Relationship Between Speech
and Amplifying Technology
In the era before Gutenberg,9 little attention was paid to the in-
tersection of speech, law, and technology because primitive technol-
ogy and mass illiteracy radically constrained the potential audience of
a controversial speaker. In a world where sophisticated communica-
tion consisted of the Book of Kells or the Bayeux tapestry, law could
safely ignore both speech and technology. With the emergence of
print technology and vernacular language, 10 however, a controversial
speaker's potential sphere of influence dramatically expanded." Sup-
porters of the status quo quickly sought to use law as a means of limit-
ing the destabilizing impact of technologically amplified speech by
regulating the technology-generally by requiring the licensing of
printers.' 2
The first great statement of the free speech principle in the An-
glo-American legal tradition, Milton's Areopagetica (1644),' 3 was a
plea to liberate print technology from government licensing. 4 Simi-
larly, the first defense of the free speech principle in the American
9. Gutenberg invented movable type in about 1450 in the city of Mainz. Louis
DUDEK, LITERATURE AND THE PRESS: A HISTORY OF PRINTING, PRINTED MEDIA AND
THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO LITERATURE 14 (1960).
10. The shift to printing in vernacular language vastly increased the potential for mass
literacy.
11. For a survey of the evolution of print technology in England, see JONATHAN W.
EMORD, FREEDOM, TECHNOLOGY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1991). See also COLIN
CLAIR, THE HISTORY OF PRINTING IN BRITAIN (1966).
12. Licensing of printing presses was initially imposed in England in 1530. It was
abandoned in 1694. See FREDERICK S. SIEBERT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN ENGLAND,
1476-1776, at 46 (1952). See also LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS
(1985); JEFFREY A. SMITH, PRINTERS AND PRESS FREEDOM (1988).
Law also sought to control access to the "technology" of vernacular language. Jan
Hus was burned for, among other sins, translating The Bible into the vernacular. MAT-
THEW SPINKA, JAN Hus: A BIOGRAPHY (1968).
13. JOHN MILTON, COMPLETE POEMS AND MAJOR PROSE 716 (Merritt Y. Hughes ed.,
1957).
14. Milton's work is closely bound up with the relationship between free speech and
scientific progress. In 1633, Galileo was placed under house arrest in Acetri by the Inquisi-
tion because he criticized Copernican theory. The young Milton, fresh from the Univer-
sity, visited Galileo at Acetri in 1638 and was deeply moved by the plight of Europe's
preeminent scientific mind. When Milton received news of Galileo's death in 1641, he
immediately began work on the Areopagetica, which eventually found an honored place in
the libraries of Madison and Jefferson and played a major role in the genesis of the First
Amendment.
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tradition, the acquittal of John Peter Zenger in 1735, refused to hold a
printer criminally responsible for the speech of a controversial
speaker.15
As Milton and Zenger illustrate, the early days of print technol-
ogy and free speech theory were characterized by a clear vertical sepa-
ration between speech and its amplifying technology. Writers wrote
and printers printed, but they were separate entities pursuing in-
dependent agendas subject to different legal rules. Whether and to
what extent we can or should seek to replicate Milton's model today
by preventing a single entity from controlling both the speech and the
amplification function remains one of our most difficult public policy
choices.' 6
The evolution of mass newspapers in the nineteenth century was
characterized by large-scale vertical integration of speech and the
newly invented rotary press. 7 Unlike New York in 1735, nineteenth
century mass circulation newspapers did not rely on independent
printers. They merged the speaker and amplifying print technology
into a powerful new institution-a speaker capable of reaching a mass
audience without help from anyone else.' 8 The result was the emer-
gence of an economically powerful, technologically amplified speaker
with enormous influence in the society.' 9
15. The Zenger trial is reported at 17 How. St. Tr. 675 (1735). James Alexander was
the actual author of the words for which John Peter Zenger, his printer, was tried. William
Bradford's pamphlet describing the Zenger trial reproduced Hamilton's summation to the
jury and became the most celebrated defense of the free speech principle in colonial
America. It went through 14 editions before 1791. For a thoughtful reinterpretation of the
Zenger trial, see Eben Moglen, Considering Zenger Partisan Politics and the Legal Profes-
sion in Provincial New York, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1495 (1994). See also EMORD, supra note
11, at 56-58; ROBERT W. JONES, JOURNALISM IN THE UNITED STATES 89-93 (1947); THE
TRIAL OF PETER ZENGER (Vincent Buranelli ed., 1957).
16. Adoption of a "common carrier" approach to amplifying technology is the most
prominent example of an attempt to return to the world of Milton and Zenger. See Note,
The Message in the Medium, supra note 8.
17. For a discussion of the technological advances that enabled the evolution of the
nineteenth century mass press, see CLAIR, supra note 11, at 205-29. For a discussion of the
impact of the telegraph on newspapers, see MENAHEM BLONDHEIM, NEWS OVER THE
WIRES: THE TELEGRAPH AND THE FLOW OF PUBLIC INFORMATION IN AMERICA 184-87
(1994).
18. Interestingly, book publishers and most magazines did not seek to integrate verti-
cally in the nineteenth century. Unlike the mass press, where the author, editor, publisher,
and printer became vertically integrated into a single economic unit, the publication of
books and most magazines involved independent authors and independent printers.
JAMES PLAYSTEAD WOOD, MAGAZINES IN THE UNITED STATES (1971).
19. The emergence of a mass press called forth a new legal response-a countervailing
right of privacy and a resurgence of the law of libel. Louis D. Brandeis & Samuel D.
Warren, The Right of Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). Neither has emerged as an
1994]
Efforts to regulate mass circulation newspapers have tended to
ignore the merger of speech and technology, presumably because
print technology is widely available to all who can afford it. The result
has been the evolution of an economically powerful, technologically
amplified speaker with no obligation to share its technological advan-
tages. 20 Even in a newspaper context, however, when a newspaper's
monopoly control over print technology threatens to prevent other
speakers from reaching an audience, regulation of the technological
amplification process takes place, usually under the rubric of the anti-
trust laws.21
The invention of revolutionary forms of amplification technology
during the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries raised the ante on
the legal relationship between speech and amplification technology.
For example, when Thomas Edison attempted to dominate the ampli-
fying technology underlying motion pictures by linking camera and
projector patents, ownership of the stock of raw film, and control over
movie distribution, federal courts ordered the dissolution of his Mo-
tion Pictures Patent Company in 1915.22 Despite the Edison case, the
motion picture industry rapidly developed into a vertically integrated
oligopoly in which a consortium of powerful studio-speakers limited
speech by independent producers, in large part because the studios
controlled the necessary amplifying technology. After a decade of an-
titrust litigation, the Paramount consent decree23 and the aggressive
prodding of the Supreme Court broke the vertical link between
speech and amplifying technology in the motion picture industry.24
The invention of the telephone triggered yet another round in the
relationship between speech and amplifying technology. Initially, we
effective check on the institution of a mass press. See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485
U.S. 46 (1988); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
20. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
21. E.g., Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969); Lorain Journal
Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1
(1945).
Financially ailing newspapers have been permitted to pool their access to amplifying
technology pursuant to joint operating agreements exempted from the antitrust laws by
Congress. See generally S. CHESTERFIELD OPPENHEIM & CARRINGTON SHIELDS, NEWSPA-
PERS AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS (1981).
22. See Dana E. Roof et al., Structural Regulation of Cable Television: A Formula for
Diversity, 15 COMM. & L. 43, 59-65 (1993) for a helpful history of the enforcement of the
antitrust laws in the motion picture context.
23. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 1940-1943 Trade Cas. (CCH) 288
(S.D.N.Y. 1940). See also United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 323
(S.D.N.Y. 1946), 70 F. Supp. 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1947), affd in part and reversed in part, 334 U.S.
131 (1948).
24. See generally MICHAEL CONANT, ANTITRUST IN THE MOTION PICTURE INDUSTRY
(1960).
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elected a radical separation of speech and amplifying technology. 25
Regulators ceded an economic monopoly to Bell Telephone over the
technological amplification process in return for a promise that Bell
would wholly divorce speech from technology and operate solely as a
conduit, not as a speaker.26 It was as though Milton had been given a
license for a massive monopoly printing press capable of serving all
comers, on the condition that everyone could use it at reasonable cost,
and that Milton himself could not speak.
Separating speech from technology in the telephone context
worked fine, at least in the early days. But the technological monop-
oly eventually turned into an anti-competitive nightmare leading to
the breakup of the Bell system.27 With the re-establishment of tech-
nological competition in the telephone area, the question of whether
the separation of speech from technology in the telephone context
should continue is at center stage.28 Once Milton's massive printing
press loses its monopoly status, why not let it speak.
The evolution of the law governing over-the-air broadcast media
reflects a profound ambivalence about whether broadcasters should
be permitted to control both speech and the technology of amplifica-
tion. Unlike the vertical integration of speech and print technology
that characterizes newspapers, the technology of over-the-air broad-
cast amplification cannot be made equally available to all comers.
The physical limits of the broadcast spectrum means that only a few
will be permitted to operate that form of amplification technology. 29
One possible regulatory response would have been to follow the
telephone model and to separate speech from broadcast technology
by requiring broadcasters to perform solely as conduits, leaving others
to perform the speech function. But Congress, seeking to replicate in
the broadcast sphere the communicative and economic power of the
vertically integrated mass newspaper, explicitly rejected the common
carrier approach for broadcasting in favor of the newspaper model of
vertical integration.3 °
25. See ROBERT W. GARNETT, THE TELEPHONE ENTERPRISE: THE EVOLUTION OF
THE BELL SYSTEM'S HORIZONTAL STRUCTURE, 1876-1909 (1985).
26. See Commerce Court (Mann-Elkins) Act, ch. 309, § 7, 36 Stat. 539 (1910). The rise
and fall of the Bell system is chronicled in MICHAEL K. KELLOGG ET AL., FEDERAL TELE-
COMMUNICATIONS LAW 5-48 (1992).
27. See KELLOGG ET AL., supra note 26, at ch. 4.
28. See Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 830 F. Supp. 909 (E.D. Va.
1993), appeal docketed No. 93-2340 (4th Cir. Oct. 15, 1993).
29. See Note, The Message in the Medium, supra note 8, at 1070-77.
30. See FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 703-04 (1979).
19941
Congress, however, never fully embraced the newspaper model.
Concerned over possible abuse of scarce broadcast technology, Con-
gress sought to retain significant regulatory control over the technol-
ogy.3' Today, an uneasy truce reigns between the concept of a
broadcaster as a full-fledged vertically integrated speaker and a
broadcaster as a partial conduit for the speech of others.32
As the newspaper antitrust cases illustrate, even a vertically inte-
grated speaker in control of both the speech function and the means
of technological amplification is subject to technological regulation
when undue control of the amplification process threatens the ability
of others to make themselves heard.33 This is especially so when con-
trol over the amplification technology is, in part, the result of a gov-
ernment decision. Thus, the FCC's chain broadcasting regulations
successfully limited the power of a vertically integrated broadcast net-
work to use its excessive control of amplification technology to limit
the speech of others.3 1 Similarly, efforts to assure fair access to own-
ership and management of the amplification technology by historically
excluded groups have been upheld by the Court,35 as have more prob-
lematic bans on the cross-ownership of print and media amplifying
technology in the same market.36
Cable broadcasting began, like the early telephone, as a classic
example of a separation between speech and technology. The early
cable television broadcasters did little more than provide a new tech-
nology for amplifying someone else's speech, which was almost always
the broadcast signals of local over-the-air stations. Cable television
functioned like Milton's printer, but without the ability to pick and
choose what it amplified.37
When cable broadcasters sought to attain a degree of vertical in-
tegration between speech and amplifying technology by selecting the
speech they wished to amplify, and by generating speech of their own,
they ran into two roadblocks. First, the FCC treated cable broadcast-
ers as satellites of the over-the-air broadcast industry and imposed re-
31. See, e.g., Radio Act of 1927, § 18 (currently codified as § 315 of the Communica-
tions Act of 1934 (current version at 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1988))).
32. Compare Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) with CBS, Inc. v.
Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
33. See, e.g., Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969); Lorain Jour-
nal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1
(1945).
34. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
35. Metro Broadcasting Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
36. FCC v. National Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775 (1978).
37. See generally DANIEL BRENNER ET AL., CABLE TELEVISION AND OTHER NON-
BROADCAST VIDEO (1986 & Supp. 1993).
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strictive regulations designed to prevent cable from posing a
competitive threat to the profitability of over-the-air broadcast tech-
nology.38 Second, regulators exhibited the same ambivalence toward
the vertical integration of cable broadcasting that has characterized
the approach to over-the-air broadcasting. On one hand, regulators
were tempted by the promise of a new category of powerful, vertically
integrated speakers with the economic power to develop and imple-
ment new speech technology and the capacity to produce quality pro-
gramming. Accordingly, cable systems were quickly authorized to
function as vertically integrated speakers in the tradition of broadcast-
ers and newspapers, as opposed to merely providing a technologically
amplified conduit for the speech of others in the tradition of initial
efforts at telephone regulation.39
On the other hand, regulators were haunted by the specter of
oligopolistic control of the new amplification technology that might
strangle competing voices in the tradition of the pre-Paramount mo-
tion picture industry and the anti-competitive track record of the old
Bell system. The net result was an untidy regulatory compromise rec-
ognizing cable broadcasters as full-fledged, vertically integrated
speakers, requiring them to make their amplification technology avail-
able to outsiders at a reasonable cost pursuant to leased-access and to
local educational and commercial over-the-air broadcasters free of
charge,40 and forbidding cable broadcasters from applying their ampli-
fication technology to an over-the-air broadcaster's speech without its
permission.4'
One possible legal approach to the regulatory compromise,
adopted by the majority of the three-judge district court in Turner
Broadcasting,42 is to uncouple cable broadcaster speech from its am-
plifying technology and to view the 1992 statute as a mere regulation
38. E.g., FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979); United States v. Midwest
Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649 (1972); United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157
(1968).
39. City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488 (1986). See
also Century Communications Corp. v. FCC, 835 F.2d 292 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Quincy Cable
TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9
(D.C. Cir. 1977).
40. See Cable Communications Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. §§ 531-532 (1988 & Supp. IV
1992) and Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L.
No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.) (specif-
ically 47 U.S.C. §§ 534-535 (Supp. IV 1992)) [hereinafter 1992 Cable Act].
41. 1992 Cable Act, supra note 40; Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct.
2445 (1994), vacating and remanding 819 F. Supp. 32 (D.D.C. 1993), reh'g denied, 115 S. Ct.
30 (1994).
42. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 819 F. Supp. 32 (D.D.C. 1993), vacated and
remanded, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994), reh'g denied, 115 S. Ct. 30 (1994).
1994]
of technology, triggering the most permissive form of scrutiny-ra-
tional basis.43
The polar approach, urged by the dissent, is to view cable broad-
casters as totally integrated speakers, so that any effort to interfere
with a broadcaster's control over amplifying technology becomes an
assault on speech itself, triggering the strictest First Amendment scru-
tiny-strict scrutiny.44
I believe that both polar approaches are wrong. Each reflects a
traditional "either/or" assumption that has viewed amplifying technol-
ogy either as inherently separate from speech or as an inherent part of
the speech itself. In fact, it is neither. There is no inherent relation-
ship between speech and amplifying technology. Rather, there are
four basic public policy questions:
1. Do we wish to permit vertically integrated speakers in the
broadcast area?
2. Do we wish to exercise any control over what such vertically
integrated broadcasters say?
3. Do we wish to make the amplifying technology available to
other speakers?
4. What does the First Amendment have to do with the answer to
the first three questions?
The answer to the first question, whether to permit (and de facto,
to foster) vertically integrated broadcasters, is driven more by eco-
nomic necessity than by First Amendment fiat. In settings like the
newspaper industry where government does not allocate control over
the amplifying technology to a favored few, a combination of First and
Fifth Amendment values probably prohibits government from forbid-
ding the vertical integration of speech and technology. We have never
confronted the legal issue, however, because, even if we could prohibit
newspapers from owning their own printing presses, it would not
make economic sense to forbid vertical integration. The economic
and social success story of linking speech to technology through a
mass press is a persuasive argument against any effort to reinvent the
Zenger model of separate ownership of speech and press. Indeed,
faced with an ailing newspaper industry, we should be increasing the
potential for vertical integration (by abolishing restrictive cross-own-
43. FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2096 (1993), is an example of a
case potentially impacting on speech that was decided on the basis of rational basis scru-
tiny. Significantly, the potential free speech issues in Beach Communications were not
before the Court.
44. Turner Broadcasting, 819 F. Supp. at 57.
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ership rules,45 for example), not thinking of ways to restrict such
integration.
In settings like over-the-air or cable broadcasting, where govern-
ment allocates ownership and control of the amplifying technology to
a favored few,46 the legal issue of whether broadcasters may be forbid-
den from developing an integrated speech arm is an open one. For
years, we have prevented telephone companies from taking such ac-
tion.47 While the legal issue is far from clear, we probably have the
power to compel the complete separation of speech and technology in
the broadcast area. Broadcasters could be made to function like
printers in Milton's time or as common carriers like the early phone
company, but why would we want them to do so?
In the broadcast area, technological innovation requires the effi-
cient assembly of enormous quantities of capital.48 Preventing vertical
45. Existing law forbids ownership of a television station and a newspaper in the same
market. 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1988). Ailing newspapers are thus denied access to infusions of
capital from logical partners, even in cities like New York, where much competition exists.
46. The rationale for government involvement in the allocation of amplifying technol-
ogy in the broadcast area varies from over-the-air (inherent necessity of allocating scarce
space on the broadcast spectrum) to cable (natural local monopoly on installation of cable
under the streets). While the rationales are different, the legal consequence of each ration-
ale is identical. When government legitimately allocates monopoly control over amplifica-
tion technology to a favored few, it retains the right to regulate the use of the technology to
assure that other voices have access to it.
Of course, if cable develops an amplifying technology that does not implicate the gov-
ernment in its allocation, its legal status may change. At present, the widespread assump-
tion is that monopoly control over cable in a community will continue to be enjoyed by a
single favored speaker. Currently, fewer than one percent of cable systems face competi-
tion from a competing system. Must Carry: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Communica-
tions of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
40 (1989). The 1992 Cable Act forbids localities from granting formal monopoly status to
cable franchisees. See Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d
1396 (9th Cir. 1985) (overturning cable monopoly), affd on narrower grounds, 476 U.S. 488
(1986).
47. The Cable Communications Act of 1984 bars local telephone companies from pro-
viding "video programming" in their service areas. 47 U.S.C. § 533(b) (Supp. IV 1992).
The FCC has recently permitted telephone companies to transmit a video dial tone, includ-
ing pay-per-view movies to subscribers. See Telephone Company-Cable Cross-Ownership
Rules, Second Report and Order, Recommendation to Congress, and Second Further Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking, 7 FCC Rcd. 5781-5847 (1992). The First Amendment implica-
tions of refusing to permit telephone companies .to function as speakers as well as conduits
are before the court in Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 830 F. Supp 909
(E.D. Va. 1993) (holding law unconstitutional), appeal docketed, No. 93-2340 (4th Cir. Oct.
15, 1993); US West, Inc. v. United States, 855 F Supp. 1184 (W.D. Wash. 1994) (holding law
unconstitutional).
48. Estimates of the amounts needed to install fiber optic wires needed for the infor-
mation superhighway range from a low of $26 billion needed to relay existing cable televi-
sion lines to $276 billion to rewire the local telephone circuits. See Note, The Message in
the Medium, supra note 8, at 1068 n.25.
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integration impedes the evolution of powerful communication entities
capable of developing and implementing new technology and produc-
ing quality programming. Thus, whether by legal rule or economic
good sense, we have opted to permit vertically integrated speakers in
the broadcast area.
Once we make the decision to permit and, thus, to foster vertical
integration of speech and broadcast technology (cable or over-the-
air), we must answer the second question-whether to seek to control
what is broadcast. It is at this point that our choices should be most
constrained by the First Amendment. Having elected to allow speak-
ers to operate as technologically amplified, vertically integrated eco-
nomic units, we should afford such powerful speakers full First
Amendment protection against government efforts to control what
they say. It would be a dangerous mistake to foster the growth of
extremely powerful, vertically integrated broadcast speakers only to
place that vast communicative power at the disposal of the
government.49
Of course, the very power of the vertically integrated broadcast
speaker has been urged by some as a justification for setting limits on
what the speaker may say.50 However, it seems risky to permit the
government to control the speech of a particularly powerful speaker,
merely because the speaker is powerful. If, in fact, a vertically inte-
grated broadcast speaker has too much power over the audience, the
last hand you want on the microphone is the government's. If verti-
cally integrated speakers are deemed too powerful, the more appro-
priate response is to adjust the degree of vertical integration between
speech and amplifying technology rather than to censor the speech
itself.
That brings us to the third, and most difficult, question: to what
extent may the government regulate the intersection between speech
and amplifying technology without infringing the free speech rights of
a vertically integrated speaker? Even if we choose to link speech and
amplifying technology in a single powerful speaker for economic rea-
49. The difficulty of controlling private concentrations of power is one of the dilemmas
of the liberal state. Thoughtful critics argue that under certain circumstances, it is better for
government to regulate powerful speakers in the common interest than to leave the area to
private choice. CAss SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993).
I hope that the Supreme Court's decision in Turner Broadcasting, discussed infra at
text accompanying notes 68-109, allows a sufficient degree of regulation designed to assure
access to amplifying technology to satisfy critics. I suspect, however, that pressure to regu-
late broadcast content will continue, generally phrased as an effort to protect vulnerable
hearers against abuse by a powerful speaker. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S.
726 (1978).
50. E.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
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sons, we do not lose all ability to regulate the amplifying technology.
This is especially true when the speaker enjoys privileged access to the
amplifying technology only because the government has bestowed it
upon him. The key is to determine when a "technology" regulation
unduly infringes the speech interest of a vertically integrated
speaker-thus triggering First Amendment scrutiny-as opposed to
merely regulating the fair use of the government-allocated amplifica-
tion technology. That task requires a more precise First Amendment
metric than the one we usually employ.
II
Toward a First Amendment Metric For Use in
Measuring the Effect on Speech of Efforts
to Regulate Amplifying Technology
I have argued that three corollaries should govern the relation-
ship between speech and amplifying technology:
Corollary I:
Primarily for reasons of economic efficiency, we should allow speak-
ers to develop vertically integrated economic units that unite the
speech function and the amplification function in a single powerful
entity.
Corollary II:
The resulting powerful, technologically amplified speaker should
enjoy full First Amendment protection over the content of its
speech.
Corollary III:
Government may, however, regulate amplifying technology that it
has allocated to a monopoly or oligopoly user to assure technical
quality, fair price, and fair use by competing speakers, but may not
impinge upon the speech function.
There is, of course, real tension between Corollary II's promise
that a technologically amplified speaker can say what it wishes and
Corollary III's insistence that it must occasionally use its amplification
facilities to broadcast the speech of others. A more precise analysis of
the effect of technological regulation on the speaker function can,
however, reduce this tension.
During the seventy years that the Supreme Court has struggled
with free speech theory,5' the model of the speech process has grown
51. The modem story of the First Amendment begins about 70 years ago with the
seminal Holmes-Brandeis opinions. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372-78 (1927)
(Brandeis, J., concurring, joined by Holmes, J.); Milwaukee Publishing Co. v. Burleson, 255
U.S. 407, 436-38 (1920) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 334-43
(1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239, 272-73 (1920) (Bran-
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from a naive preoccupation with the speaker to an effort to integrate
the hearer into the Court's analysis. 2 It is time to expand the model
even further to take account of the conduit.
In the beginning, there was the speaker. The modern Supreme
Court's encounter with free speech opens with the paradigm of the
heroic speaker of conscience, pressed by her art or her politics or her
science or her religion to speak the truth to a hostile world that pre-
fers silence. 3 The romantic conception of the speaker of conscience
dominated the first fifty years of contemporary free speech theory in
the Supreme Court. The high level of protection for worthless, even
destructive speech, like the Nazi invective in Skokie, 4 flowed in large
part from the Court's historic tendency to place the speaker at the
center of the First Amendment universe. While the benefits of free
speech for hearers and the greater society were occasionally trotted
out as rhetorical flourishes in the early cases, the early years of mod-
ern free speech protection were speaker-centered.
Several events nudged the Supreme Court away from an exclu-
sively speaker-centered view of the First Amendment. Free speech
cases arose where it was difficult to identify a protected speaker.
Challenges to government secrecy raised the issue of the unwilling
speaker. 6 Troublesome cases arose involving involuntary hearers
where the usual serendipity between willing speaker and willing
hearer did not exist.57 Entire categories of speech arose where the
principal justification for First Amendment protection was the
hearer's right to know. 8 The net effect was a quantum shift in the
deis, J., dissenting, joined by Holmes, J.); Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466, 482-95
(1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting, joined by Holmes, J.); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S.
616, 624-31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting, joined by Brandeis, J.); Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (Holmes, J.).
52. 1 have discussed the relationship between speaker-centered and hearer-centered
theories of the First Amendment in Burt Neuborne, The First Amendment and Govern-
ment Regulation of the Capital Markets, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 5 (1989).
53. See STEVEN SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE
(1990).
54. National Socialist Party v. Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977). See also Collin v. Smith, 447
F. Supp. 676 (N.D. Ill.), affd, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916
(1978). Skokie is a paradigmatic speaker-centered case.
55. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S.
301 (1965).
56. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403
U.S. 713 (1971).
57. E.g., Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994), reh'g denied, 115
S. Ct. 23 (1994); Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
58. The two most prominent examples of protected speech in the absence of romantic
speakers are commercial and corporate speech. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435
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free speech universe to a greater concern with the interest of
hearers.59
The full implications of integrating the hearer's interest into the
speaker-centered world of the First Amendment have yet to be re-
solved. Since a hearer-sensitive view of the speech process will be
more instrumental than the speaker-centered version, a hearer-cen-
tered vision of the speech process carries with it the dangerous poten-
tial for diluting the rights of speakers. This is especially true when the
interests of speakers and hearers are said to diverge. The chronic in-
stability of much First Amendment doctrine-witness the residential
picketing cases,6° the anti-solicitation decisions,6' or the cases dealing
with indecent broadcast speech 62-is attributable to the fact that we
have not yet developed a metric to weigh the interests of speakers
against the interest of hearers and have not decided who should win
when the interests diverge.
Just as events overtook an exclusively speaker-centered view of
the First Amendment in favor of greater concern with the interests of
hearers, the reality of contemporary communication technology is
forcing us to acknowledge that the modern speech process involves at
least one more significant player-the conduit, who conveys speech
from speaker to hearer, generally through the medium of technologi-
cal amplification. We have not yet begun to define the precise legal
rights of the conduit, often because we have tended to merge the con-
duit with the speaker, treating the process of amplification as though
it were inherently a part of the speech function.
Often, it is unnecessary to attempt to sort out the separate
speaker, hearer, and conduit interests because all three interests pull
in the same direction. However, with the emergence of vertically inte-
grated broadcasters using amplification technologies bestowed on a
favored few by the government, we can no longer afford such a luxury.
Since the interests of conduits may conflict with the interest of speak-
ers or hearers, we must work out a way of dealing with the conflicts.
U.S. 765, reh'g denied, 438 U.S. 907 (1978); Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
59. The interests of hearers were prominently featured in Red Lion Broadcasting Co.
v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
60. E.g., Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994); Frisby v. Schultz, 487
U.S. 474 (1988).
61. E.g., International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701
(1992); Lee v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2609 (1992);
Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
62. E.g., Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989); FCC v. Pacifica
Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
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The best way out of the "either-or" box that views powerful con-
duit-speakers either as fair game for widespread censorship of content
or as loose cannons beyond the reach of regulatory control,63 is to
uncouple the speaker function from the conduit function. Doing so
would protect the former and regulate the latter.
This requires asking at least three questions about the precise ef-
fect of a proposed regulation. First, does a regulation force a verti-
cally integrated speaker to transmit something it would not otherwise
say? Second, what is the speaker's precise objection to transmitting
the required material? Third, does the regulation prevent the trans-
mission of something the speaker wishes to say?
Much, perhaps most, regulation of amplifying technology never
progresses beyond the first question. If a regulation affects the ampli-
fying technology without affecting the speech function, it simply does
not implicate the First Amendment. Most efforts at regulation of cost,
technical quality, structural organization, and taxation fall into this
category. Even regulations appearing to affect content, such as must-
carry rules, do not actually affect the speech function if the broad-
caster would have carried the signal in the absence of the regulation.
When, however, a regulation forces a technologically amplified
speaker to act as a conduit for something it otherwise would not say,
the speech function is obviously implicated.64 But, in the absence of a
content based objection to amplifying the speech in question, the in-
terference may not violate the First Amendment. For example, a re-
luctance to act as a conduit for someone else's speech based on non-
content related criteria, such as a disagreement about audience de-
mand, a disagreement over fees, or a desire to maximize market share,
can be overridden without a serious intrusion into the speech function.
Overriding a conduit's views about audience desires, transmission
fees, or market share is simply not the same as forcing a conduit to
pledge allegiance to an idea it hates, or to say something with which it
disagrees.65 In the absence of such a significant content based objec-
tion, requiring a conduit to amplify the speech of a third person does
not materially subvert the speaker function.
In at least two settings, though, technology regulations affecting
broadcast content will materially interfere with the speaker function.
63. The "either/or" approach is exemplified by the approach of both the majority and
dissent in the district court's decision in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 819 F.
Supp. 32 (D.D.C. 1993), vacated and remanded, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994), reh'g denied, 115 S.
Ct. 30 (1994).
64. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n of California, 475 U.S. 1 (1986).
65. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Bar-
nette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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When a conduit is forced to amplify speech with which it disagrees, or
is forced to displace preferred speech in favor of coerced speech, the
speech function is overridden by the desire to regulate technology.
Conduit objections to substantive content, while clearly posing a
substantial speech-based issue, can arguably be dealt with by permit-
ting a disclaimer and a disavowal of responsibility by the amplifier.
We follow precisely that course when we compel speech on private
property, 66 or permit religious speech on public property.67
Displacement of a broadcast-speaker's preferred speech by the
coerced speech of third persons raises the most significant speech-
based objection, especially where the broadcaster's objection to the
coerced speech is linked to substantive content. When preferred
speech is displaced by coerced speech, the conduit function has blot-
ted out the speech function, triggering classic First Amendment
protection.
I believe that the legal rules governing efforts to regulate amplify-
ing technology should vary according to the degree of interference
with the speech function. If a regulation does not implicate a signifi-
cant speech interest, it is not subject to First Amendment scrutiny. If
a regulation requires a broadcaster to act as an involuntary conduit
but does not require a broadcaster to transmit material with which it
disagrees, the regulation affects the broadcaster's speech interest but
does not materially infringe it. If, however, a regulation displaces a
broadcaster's preferred speech in favor of speech with which it dis-
agrees, the regulation directly attacks the speech function and, thus,
should satisfy a rigorous First Amendment standard of review. How,
if at all, would such a proposed scheme work in the Turner Broadcast-
ing case?
Il
Turner Broadcasting and the Tricameral Media
Any effort to disentangle the speech function from the conduit
function must be fact intensive. Until a court measures the precise
effect of a conduit regulation on the speech function, it cannot know
whether the regulation should be tested under the First Amendment
or some less demanding standard. Unfortunately, the district court in
the Turner Broadcasting case failed to make this evaluation.68
66. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
67. Allegheny County v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
68. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 819 F. Supp. 32 (D.D.C. 1993), vacated and
remanded, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994), reh'g denied, 115 S. Ct. 30 (1994).
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In its haste to assure speedy judicial review of the 1992 Cable
Act, Congress provided for an accelerated review procedure involving
a three-judge court and a direct appeal to the Supreme Court.69 The
accelerated review provisions encouraged a wide-ranging facial attack
on the leased-access and must-carry rules imposed by the statute. In-
stead of requiring a series of as-applied challenges to the regulations
by broadcasters with a specific, factually-rooted complaint capable of
being assessed by the courts, Congress' special review procedures en-
couraged an outpouring of facial challenges to the 1992 Cable Act
based on hypothetical events and anecdotal assertions. Little, if any,
effort was made in the district court to pinpoint the precise nature of
the interference with the speech function claimed by the multiple
parties.
Moreover, for understandable reasons, the legal strategy followed
by each of the three major parties in Turner Broadcasting tended to
downplay the facts. It is no coincidence that all parties agreed that
summary judgment was appropriate. ° The government downplayed
the facts because, as a matter of policy, it sought to avoid judicial sec-
ond-guessing of Congress' factual assumptions about the necessity for
the must-carry and leased-access rules. In effect, the government ar-
gued that when regulation of amplifying technology is at issue, Con-
gress should make the final call about whether the regulation is
needed.7' Thus, no matter how drastic the resulting interference with
the speaker function, such regulation would be subject to relaxed ra-
tional basis scrutiny in the courts. The net effect of this would be to
uncouple speech from amplifying technology, leaving Congress free to
regulate amplifying technology, even when the regulation directly in-
terferes with such speech function.
The cable broadcasters downplayed the facts for two reasons:
first, because their knockout punch, the asserted analogy between
cable broadcasters and newspapers, would be weakened by close fac-
tual scrutiny of their local monopoly status; second, because a close
look at the facts might have revealed how thin the actual interference
with the speech (as opposed to the conduit) function really was.
Finally, the over-the-air broadcasters downplayed the facts be-
cause they were afraid to put Congress' assumptions about the possi-
ble abuse of the cable "gatekeeper" function into judicial play, and
because they recognized that in a few settings the cable broadcaster
69. 47 U.S.C. § 532(d) (Supp. IV 1992).
70. Turner Broadcasting, 819 F. Supp. at 38.
71. lrner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2455-57 (1994), vacating and
remanding 819 F. Supp. 32 (D.D.C. 1993), reh'g denied, 115 S. Ct. 30 (1994).
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speech function (as this Article has attempted to define it) is genu-
inely overridden when a cable broadcaster must delete its preferred
speech in favor of the speech of others.72
The net result was a district court record that did not begin to
explore the actual impact of the must-carry rules on the cable broad-
casters' speech functions, and a set of highly competent Supreme
Court briefs that made little effort to distinguish the speech from the
conduit function. 73 Despite the unfortunate procedural posture, how-
ever, the Supreme Court in Turner Broadcasting made real strides to-
wards a reasoned approach to the relationship between law and
technology.74
When the dust cleared, it became apparent that the Court in Tur-
ner Broadcasting established a tricameral media.75 When regulating
the print media, amplifying technology is to be treated as an integral
part of the act of speaking.76 When regulating the over-the-air broad-
cast media, amplifying technology is to be treated as severable from
the act of speaking in order to assure a broad diversity of voices on
the "scarce" broadcast spectrum.77 When regulating the cable broad-
casters, amplifying technology is to be severable from the act of
speaking when necessary to prevent abuse of a cable broadcaster's
"gatekeeper" powers.78 Finally, all efforts to regulate the amplifica-
tion function that impinge on the speech function must be justified by
a factual showing of necessity.79
The precise issue in Turner Broadcasting was the constitutionality
of the must-carry rules imposed by Congress in the 1992 Cable Act.
Under must-carry, cable broadcasters must include the signals of all
local over-the-air television broadcasters in their basic package.80
Congress imposed the must-carry rules in order to protect over-the-air
broadcasters from potential discrimination at the hands of cable
broadcasters who control access to cable systems and who are said to
72. My assessments of the parties' strategic thinking in Turner Broadcasting is, admit-
tedly, purely subjective. I base it on my own experience as a litigator.
73. See, e.g., Appellant's Brief, Turner Broadcasting (No. 93-44); Respondent's Brief,
Turner Broadcasting (No. 93-44); Reply Brief, Turner Broadcasting (No. 93-44).
74. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2445.
75. Id. at 2454-72. My use of the "tricameral" metaphor owes its genesis to Lee Bol-
linger's helpful article describing a bicameral media. Lee C. Bollinger, Freedom of the
Press and Public Access: Toward a Theory of Partial Regulation of the Mass Media, 75
MICH. L. REV. 1 (1976).
76. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2465.
77. Id. at 2457.
78. Id. at 2468.
79. Id. at 2471.
80. 47 U.S.C. § 534 (Supp. IV 1992).
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have a motive to weaken or destroy over-the-air broadcasters.81
Cable broadcasters challenged the must-carry rules, arguing that they
were content-based efforts to control the speech of the cable broad-
cast industry. 2 Justice Kennedy, writing for a shifting majority in Tur-
ner Broadcasting,3 sought to establish a framework for analyzing the
free speech rights of cable broadcasters.8 4
Analogizing the 1992 Cable Act to the antitrust laws, the govern-
ment argued that the must-carry rules should be subject merely to "ra-
tional basis" scrutiny, since they are bona fide efforts to assure
diversity and fair structure in the broadcast industry. 5 Eight mem-
bers of the Court (Kennedy, Rehnquist, Blackmun, O'Connor, Scalia,
Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg) rejected the government's rational ba-
sis position on two grounds.8 6 First, they rejected the notion that ef-
forts to correct for market breakdown in the speech area should be
governed by rational basis scrutiny, noting that such an approach
would require the overruling of Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo.8 7
Second, they rejected the analogy between over-the-air and cable
broadcasters.8 8 Although efforts to assure diversity in the over-the-air
broadcast world may be subject to relaxed scrutiny under Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,8 9 Justice Kennedy reasoned that the govern-
ment's increased regulatory power over traditional radio and televi-
sion is justified only because of the scarcity of broadcast frequencies.90
Because scarce frequencies make it impossible to add more speakers,
the existing frequencies may be monitored to assure fair access and
diversity.
Cable television, wrote Justice Kennedy, does not pose a scarcity
problem.9 Technology promises a virtually inexhaustible number of
cable stations. Thus, Justice Kennedy reasoned, efforts to assure di-
versity in the cable world should not be governed by the same ground
rules that govern the over-the-air world.92 Only Justice Stevens, in a
81. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2454.
82. Id. at 2461.
83. Four Justices filed separate opinions, and three Justices joined in Justice
O'Connor's dissenting opinion. Id. at 2445.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 2458.
86. Id. at 2461.
87. Id. at 2458-59; see Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
88. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2457-58.
89. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
90. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2456-57.
91. Id. at 2457.
92. Id. at 2457-58.
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concurring opinion, appeared willing to endorse aspects of the govern-
ment's rational basis position.93
A majority of the Court similarly rejected the arguments of cable
broadcasters that efforts to regulate cable speech should be governed
by the same stringent rules that insulate newspapers from government
regulation.94 Writing for a narrower five-Justice majority (Kennedy,
Rehnquist, Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter), Justice Kennedy noted
that although the scarcity problem does not exist in the cable area, the
technology of cable allows cable broadcasters to be "gatekeepers" for
the speech of others, such as over-the-air broadcasters.95 Content-
neutral efforts to regulate a cable broadcaster's "gatekeeper" func-
tion, argued Justice Kennedy, should not be subject to strict scrutiny,
but to the intermediate O'Brien96 standard that is more stringent than
rational basis but less stringent than strict scrutiny.97
Writing for the same five-Justice majority, Justice Kennedy re-
jected the cable industry's alternative argument that the must-carry
rules are an exercise in content-based regulation of speech triggering
strict scrutiny, arguing that the content of the speech had nothing to
do with Congress' desire to impose must-carry rules in an effort to
preserve the economic health of the over-the-air broadcast industry.98
Four Justices vigorously dissented (O'Connor, Scalia, Ginsburg,
and Thomas), arguing that Congress' concern with protecting local
programming and non-profit television was clearly content-based, and
thus subject to the lethal strict scrutiny test of a compelling state inter-
est and no less drastic means. Since they believed the must-carry rules
to be content-based, the four dissenters did not express themselves on
the appropriate standard governing content-neutral regulation of
cable's gatekeeper function.
Justice Kennedy lost his majority when he attempted to apply the
O'Brien test to the record before the district court. Because the lower
court had granted summary judgment, almost no factual development
took place. Four members of the Court (Kennedy, Rehnquist, Black-
mun, and Souter) held that additional hearings were needed below to
determine whether Congress had developed sufficient evidence on
which to base its fear that over-the-air broadcasters were in danger of
being harmed by improper use of the gatekeeper function. 99 The
93. Id. at 2474-75.
94. Id. at 2464-66.
95. Id.
96. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
97. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2469.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 2473.
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same four Justices also wished to see a factual development of the
precise impact of the must-carry rules on cable broadcasters. 100
Justice Stevens believed that the legislative record developed
over three years of hearings was sufficient to satisfy the O'Brien
test.' Indeed, he declined to join the portion of the Court's opinion
rejecting the government plea for rational basis review. Accordingly,
he would have voted to affirm.0 2 Justice Stevens, however, lent his
vote to the Kennedy plurality in order to achieve a dispositive set of
instructions for the lower court,103 because four members of the Court
believed that the 1992 Cable Act should be measured by strict scrutiny
on remand and four members believed that remand was necessary to
decide whether intermediate scrutiny was satisfied.
When all the smoke clears, Turner Broadcasting stands for two
important principles. First, it establishes a threefold structure for me-
dia regulation. Newspapers are governed by Tornillo.'° Over-the-air
broadcasters are governed by Red Lion Broadcasting, at least where
the regulation is an effort to advance diversity of views.105 Cable
broadcasters receive Tornillo-like protection when the regulation
seeks to control content0 6 but O'Brien protection when the regula-
tion is a content-neutral effort to regulate the gatekeeper function.0 7
Second, Turner Broadcasting reasserts the important institutional
responsibility of the judiciary to conduct an independent review of the
factual sufficiency of legislative justifications for regulating amplifica-
tion technology.' 8 On remand, the district court will be placed in the
awkward position of second-guessing Congress' judgment that the
must-carry rules are necessary to protect over-the-air broadcasters
from gatekeeper abuse. Requiring careful judicial scrutiny of the as-
serted justifications for regulations of technology that impinge on
speech is necessary, however, if the legal rules are to have teeth.
Moreover, on remand, the district court should make a serious
effort to disentangle the speech and conduit functions in order to as-
sess the actual impact of the 1992 regulations on the behavior of cable
broadcasters. First, it should ask whether the must-carry rules actually
affect a cable broadcaster's speech function. The vast bulk of cable
100. Id.
101. Id. at 2472-74.
102. Id. at 2473-74.
103. Id. at 2475.
104. Id. at 2464.
105. Id. at 2456.
106. Id. at 2465.
107. Id. at 2469.
108. Id. at 2473.
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systems may wish to carry the signals of local over-the-air stations and
do not object to reasonably priced leased access. The 1992 Cable Act
does not implicate their speech functions at all. When a cable broad-
caster performs as a willing conduit, no First Amendment interests are
violated. Speculation about possible future conflict should not force
the district court into deciding a facial challenge to the statute.
Second, the district court should identify those relatively few
cable broadcasters who are being forced to carry signals they would
otherwise have refused to transmit and explore the broadcasters' re-
luctance to amplify the over-the-air signal. If a cable broadcaster's
reluctance to allow the use of an otherwise unused channel is based on
disagreements that do not materially implicate the speech function,
such as disagreements about audience demand, signal quality, trans-
mission fees, or market share, the broadcaster may be required to act
as a conduit without material damage to its speech function. The
broadcaster enjoys monopoly access to the amplifying technology.
Therefore, it can be forced to share the amplifying technology as long
as its speaker function is not impaired. At most, such a predominantly
conduit-based regulation should be measured by the energized ra-
tional basis standard used in City of Cleburne.10 9
Third, the court should single 'out the (perhaps non-existent)
cable broadcasters whose reluctance to carry an over-the-air broad-
cast signal on an otherwise unused channel is motivated by a disagree-
ment over substantive content. At that point, coercing a cable
broadcaster to operate as an involuntary conduit for speech with
which it disagrees undoubtedly impacts on the speech function. Re-
quiring someone, even a conduit, to assist in the dissemination of ma-
terial with which it disagrees seriously impinges on the speaker
function, even if a disclaimer is attempted. Therefore, the court
should require a substantial showing of need before enforcing such a
regulation. Since the availability of a disclaimer somewhat alleviates,
but does not eliminate, the impact on the speech function, intermedi-
ate scrutiny under O'Brien seems appropriate.
Finally, the court on remand should identify settings in which a
cable broadcaster is required to displace preferred speech from a sys-
tem operating at capacity in order to make room for the speech of
someone else. Even in this setting, it might be possible to ask whether
the forced substitution impinges on a material speech interest, for ex-
ample in situations where the preference is not based on any content-
related criteria. However, the coerced displacement of a broad-
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caster's speech by someone else's speech is a direct impingement on
the speaker function, whatever the broadcaster's motives may be.
Thus, before a regulation could force the displacement of an existing
signal, the regulation should satisfy an exacting First Amendment
showing of factual necessity at least as stringent as O'Brien.
It should, of course, be noted that the displacement scenario is a
vanishing phenomenon. Most existing cable systems are currently op-
erating with excess capacity. Within the foreseeable future, the five
hundred channel system will be commonplace, making it extremely
unlikely that displacement will be a serious problem.
In short, the court deciding the Turner Broadcasting case on re-
mand should determine exactly what the impact on the speech func-
tion really is. On remand, it is likely that most of the cable
broadcasters will not be able to point to a material interference with
the speech function because they would have carried the signal any-
way, or because the reluctance to carry the signal on an unused chan-
nel is not based on content. If a close scrutiny of the facts reveals a
cable broadcaster with a claim of material infringement on the speech
function because the broadcaster actually disagrees with the coerced
speech, or because the coerced speech displaces other speech, we
should refuse to enforce the regulation as applied to that broadcaster,
unless the government makes a fact-based showing of necessity far
stronger than that made in the original Turner Broadcasting record.
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